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Abstract 
 
This paper brings new insights on gender interaction in the management of hybrid organizations. Our 
database comes from Union des Mutuelles du Partenariat pour la Mobilisation de l’Epargne et du 
Crédit au Sénégal (UM-PAMECAS), a Senegalese network made of 38 financial cooperatives 
providing 419,602 members with micro-loans. We use fixed-effect panel estimation to analyze the 
interplay of female/male-dominated boards with female/male managers. The regressions explain the 
average loan size and the proportion of loans granted to women. Our results show that male 
managers mitigate the social orientation of female-dominated boards. In contrast, female managers 
tend to enhance this orientation. More puzzling is the influence of female managers associated with 
male-dominated boards. In this case, the presence of a female manager increases the average loan 
size and reduces the proportion of loans granted to women. In sum, female managers tend to align 
their objectives on those of the local board even though their hierarchy is at the central level. They 
avoid as much as possible conflicts with their local board members. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Financial cooperatives (FCs) are hybrid organizations combining banking activities with democratic 
governance.
1
 This unusual combination makes FCs fertile ground for examining the behavior of 
women in leadership positions. On the one hand, the financial sector is knowingly male-dominated 
and plagued by gender stereotypes (Ogden et al., 1985; Petit, 2007). Women hardly access 
leadership positions in banks (Özbilgin and Woodward, 2004). On the other, organizations 
benefitting from internal democracy are more open-minded toward female leadership. Gender 
imbalances in top management exist in non-profit organizations but they are less pronounced than in 
private companies (Lyon and Humbert, 2012).  
Female participation in leadership role is often advocated as a significant driver of firm 
performance (Oakley, 2000; Krishnan et al., 2005; Smith et al., 2006). Female leaders seem to differ 
from men in management style. A meta-analysis leads Eagley and Johnson (1990, p. 233)
2
 to the 
conclusion that women in leadership positions tend to “adopt a more democratic or participative 
style and a less autocratic or directive style” than their male counterparts. Interestingly, Druskat 
(1994) and Meinhard and Foster (2003) observe similar characteristics in non-profit institutions. 
However, the precise way female top managers influence profits or social performances remains 
poorly elucidated, let alone situations where the two bottom lines clash. We bridge the gap by 
exploiting a detailed hand-collected database covering the second largest network of FCs in Senegal. 
This paper addresses the attitude of female leaders in organizations where tensions prevail 
between social and financial objectives. Although FCs are fit to study the governance of this type of 
organizations, few papers take that stance, probably because exhaustive micro-data is lacking. 
Exceptions include MCKillop et al. (2003) who analyze the impact of women participation in Irish 
FCs. The authors provide evidence of male predominance in governance bodies. Women are more 
present in member-interface positions than in strategic and top-management ones. These results are 
                                                        
1
 See Jones and Kalmi (2009) for a worldwide survey on the cooperative sector. 
2
 This analysis was later supplemented by Eagly and Johannesen-Schmidt (2001). 
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in line with the gender imbalance observed in democratic institutions by Miller et al. (1982) and 
Heenan and McLaughlin (2002). Closer to our topic, Mayoux (2001) studies a Cameroonian network 
of 22 local FCs. She finds out that the majority of savers are female whereas women are 
underrepresented in the governance bodies. Concurrently, female savings are recycled into low-
interest loans to men. The author stresses that female leaders sometimes contribute to gender 
inequalities. However, the evidence rests upon two female-governed FCs only. By working with a 
larger network and using time variations of both the composition of the FCs governing bodies and 
the characteristics of the granted loans, we deliver a more nuanced –and likely more robust– picture.  
Our unique database comes from a network of 38 Senegalese local cooperatives (LCs) grouped 
under the authority of a central union (CU). In May 2010, the network was serving over 400,000 
members, whom 53% are women. The governance structure of the network rests upon a subtle mix 
of centralization and decentralization. At the central level, the CU takes care of the financial 
sustainability of the network. Importantly, the CU executive team is in charge of the human resource 
management. At the local level, each LC democratically elects its own board. Logically, local boards 
prioritize their members’ satisfaction over financial discipline. According to the CU’s Vice-
President, “the employees are more concerned with the profitability of the network, whereas elected 
members are more preoccupied by the social performances of their local financial cooperative”.3 As 
a consequence, tensions between financial and social objectives, if any, translate into a central-
versus-local perspective.
4
  
The main activity of the LC’s is credit provision. On average, loans to women have about half 
the size of those granted to men. In line with the microfinance literature, we measure social 
performances by means of average loan size and percentage of female borrowers. The loan-granting 
decisions are made jointly by the local board and the manager who is quasi-independent from this 
board. Our first results show that female board members favor social orientation in loan granting, 
even when controlling for membership gender composition. These results confirm previous evidence 
                                                        
3
 Interview conducted on the 21
st
 of January 2010. 
4
 Desrochers and Fischer (2005) and Nair and Kloeppinger-Todd (2007) find that FCs that are more closely integrated are 
also more financially sustainable.  
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that firms with a higher fraction of women on the board exhibit more social and ethical orientations 
(Smith et al., 2001; Bernardi et al., 2009, Krüger, 2010). 
Regarding governance issues, our results are twofold. First, we show that the CU tends to send 
male managers to LCs with female-dominated boards. We interpret this as evidence of the aim of the 
CU management to curb social biases that might hinder the consolidated financial situation of the 
network. Second, our regressions indicate that, when associated with female-dominated boards, male 
managers mitigate the social orientation while female managers enhance this orientation. More 
puzzling is the influence of female managers associated with male-dominated boards. In this case, 
the presence of a female manager increases the average loan size and reduces the proportion of loans 
granted to women. These findings lead us to conclude that female managers tend to align their 
objectives on those of the local board even though their hierarchy is at the CU level. Female 
managers avoid as much as possible conflicts with their local boards. In sum, our results confirm that 
female managers adopt a more consensual and democratic behavior than their male counterparts.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 depicts the situation of financial 
cooperatives in Senegal from a gender perspective. Section 3 presents our dataset. Section 4 offers 
regression analysis. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Women and Financial Cooperatives in Senegal 
 
All over the developing world, FCs contribute to female access to financial services. According to 
Fletschner (2009), among the three major sources of credit in rural Eastern Paraguay (State banks, 
wholesalers and FCs) only FCs serve women. Likewise, Boucher et al. (1993) observe that 
Guatemalan credit unions do not suffer from major gender biases, which contrasts with other 
financial institutions in Guatemala. Mersland (2009) shows that worldwide FCs are gender balanced 
with a 51.9% average share of female members. Nevertheless, microfinance institutions with for-
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profit and NGO statuses do better than FCs by serving 55% and 82.1% of female clients, 
respectively. D’Espallier et al. (2011) confirm that NGOs are more likely to adopt women-friendly 
policies than FCs and fort-profit MFIs. 
The situation of women in Senegal compares favorably to the situation in the rest of the 
developing world. Gender inequalities in West Africa are lower than elsewhere (Deaton, 1997). 
Senegalese women are financially active (Lyons and Snoxell, 2005) and increasingly engage in 
economic activities (Guérin, 2001).
5
 Female-run small businesses represent approximately one third 
of the informal sector in Senegal. Women routinely participate in traditional rotated savings and 
credits associations (ROSCAs), which enable them to borrow and save small amounts of cash.
6
 
ROSCAs reinforce social capital among members. In addition, ROSCAs act as an insurance 
mechanism against financial distress since the members help each other in case of emergency. 
Women in Senegal typically control their own income while remaining subordinated to men who 
traditionally provide the lion’s share of household’s income (Creevey, 1991). Economic 
empowerment is sometimes associated with an increase in intra-household tensions (Sow, 2003; 
Perry, 2005). 
Despite this relatively favorable situation, women in Senegal keep facing customary patriarchal 
norms, which exclude them from access to both property and formal financial services (Noponen, 
1991). In an effort to overcome this issue, the Government of Senegal decided to provide a special 
legal status for cooperatives in 1983. The aim was to democratize cooperatives and empower their 
female members. With hindsight, one might conclude that the impact of the legal status is mixed. On 
the one hand, traditional cooperatives active in the agriculture remain mostly led by males. As put by 
Creevey (1991, p.353), “By law, women may join the cooperatives but, in practice, they seldom do.” 
                                                        
5
 However, the situation varies across ethnic groups. Women from originally nomadic groups, such as Peulh and Hall 
Peular, tend to enjoy lower responsibilities than those from Wolof and Serere groups (Creevey, 1991).  
6
 ROSCA’s members meet on a regular basis. In each meeting, the members contribute with a fixed amount to a common 
pot. This pot goes to a member designated in a strict alternation pattern. As a result, the member who gets the pot is a 
borrower and the other ones are savers. 
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On the other, in the wake of the microfinance movement a new generation of FCs
7
 has come into 
existence. These FCs devote a special attention to women and offer them specific financial services.  
The Senegalese Union des Mutuelles du Partenariat pour la Mobilisation de l’Epargne et du 
Crédit au Sénégal (UM-PAMECAS) belongs to the new generation of FCs. It is currently one of the 
largest networks of FCs in West Africa. In May 2010, the network made of 38 LCs was serving a 
total of 419,602 members providing them with micro-loans and micro-savings opportunities.
8
 The 
consolidated outstanding loan portfolio was EUR 35.9M,
9
 corresponding to the granting of 62,410 
micro-loans. The globalized deposits amounted to EUR 36.6M.
10
  
The history of UM-PAMECAS helps understanding its current structure. In 1996, the Canadian 
institution Développement International Desjardins (DID) undertook a microfinance project to 
supply financial services to the poor living in the suburbs of Dakar, the capital city of Senegal. This 
initiative was supported by the Canadian International Development Agency. First, DID set up three 
LCs and grouped them under the CU to achieve economies of scale and enhance financial 
sustainability. In 1998, after a two-year experimental phase, UM-PAMECAS became an official 
institution. The network experienced a rapid growth and extended its activities beyond the Dakar 
neighborhoods, and notably in rural areas. The current objective of UM-PAMECAS is to cover the 
whole country. Both the CU and the LCs are legal entities with the FC status. In principle, LCs are 
free to leave the network. In practice though, they enjoy limited autonomy. So far, no LC has ever 
exerted its right to stand alone.  
                                                        
7
 To avoid confusing them with traditional cooperatives, the FCs have a specific name (« Mutuelles d’épargne et de 
crédit »). 
8
 The savings products supplied by UM-PAMECAS include interest-free flexible savings accounts, interest-bearing 
deposit accounts, and a savings program combining interest-bearing savings with access to business credit. 
9
 Taking into account the loans with arrears, the loan portfolio of UM-PAMECAS amounted to EUR 37.9M. 
10
 For readability, we express all monetary figures in euros (EUR). The local currency is the CFA franc (CFAF), the 
common currency of all member states of the West-African Economic and Monetary Union. CFAF has a fixed parity 
with the euro (EUR 1 = CFAF 655.957). 
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Each LC of UM-PAMECAS has four governance bodies. First, the General Meeting brings 
together all the members annually, and elects its representatives to the three other bodies.
11
 Second, 
the Board composed of nine directors meets every two months, and defines the local strategic 
orientations within the limits drafted by the CU. For instance, the local Board is entitled to set 
priorities regarding credit recovery, sensitization to cooperative spirit, and gender empowerment. 
Third, the local Credit Committee is composed of five elected members, and meets every week or 
every two weeks. This committee makes the decisions on loan granting on the basis of application 
files previously analyzed by credit officers.
12
 Last, the Supervisory Committee is composed of five 
elected members. This Committee controls the operations and collects opinions and 
recommendations from the LC members.  
The CU of UM-PAMECAS is supervised by two main bodies: the CU Board composed of the 
local Board chairpersons, and the CU Supervisory Committee composed of seven representatives 
elected by the LCs. The CU Board defines the network strategic orientations. In particular, it decides 
upon product design, expansion strategy, and network configuration. The CU Board appoints an 
Executive Committee. Since 2003, human resources are managed at the CU level for the whole 
network. All the LC staff is now hired and dispatched by the CU.
13
 The CU is also in charge of the 
management information system.    
 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
The period over investigation stretches from December 2006 to May 2010. Our dataset is built by 
bringing together information from three different files used by the managers of UM-PAMECAS. 
First, for each LC we dispose of the gender compositions of both total membership and governing 
                                                        
11 100 members need to be present to proceed to elections. The sizes of the local governing body are standardized all 
through the network. In practice however, these sizes may slightly deviate from their target values due to unexpected 
circumstances. 
12 This applies to the loans below EUR 4,573. The final say on larger loans (1.2% of the sample) requires the approval 
by the CU authorities. 
13
 Before 2003, the local staff was partly recruited by local boards. Centralization is supposed to ensure the consistency 
of the wage policy as well as staff independence from the local authorities (Tutunji and Serres, 2005). 
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bodies, updated four times a year.
14
 Second, we have the financial statements reported by the LCs to 
the CU on a monthly basis. The data includes aggregate characteristics, such as the LC’s outstanding 
loan portfolios and total assets. Third, we possess disaggregated information on the loan 
beneficiaries and their credit arrangements. Based on this information, we have constructed the 
following variables for each LC in each month: number of loans granted, percentage of loans granted 
to women, percentage of total credit granted to women, and average loan size for male and female 
borrowers, respectively.   
Overall, our dataset is made of an unbalanced panel of 1,531 monthly observations (38 LCs 
over 42 months). Altogether, the 38 LCs have granted 212,856 loans over the period under study. 
We have taken out the few group loans and those for which the sex of the borrower is unclear, which 
leaves us with a total of 201,093 loans.  
Appendix A features detailed information on the LCs. The typical staff of a LC includes one 
manager, one chief cashier, four cashiers and three credit officers. The manager supervises the 
operations, the chief cashier is in charge of the accounting, the cashiers take care of the financial 
transactions with members, and the credit officers analyze the credit demands and subsequently 
enforce repayment. Overall, the LC staffs are gender balanced. In 2010, 51% of the LC employees 
were female. However, women are under-represented in the top managerial position (29%). This 
gender unbalance is more pronounced in large LCs.  
All over the world, women are poorer than men on average. Senegal is no exception to the rule. 
To address this reality, UM-PAMECAS has designed a special credit product targeting poor women. 
The so-called AFSSEF
15
 loans are offered to women who are less able to provide collateral. In 
addition, UM-PAMECAS proposes various credit arrangements grouped into four categories: small-
                                                        
14
 More precisely, we have relevant information for the following months: December 2006; June, September, November, 
and December 2007; June, September, November, and December 2008; May, June, September, November, and 
December 2009; February, April and May 2010. In our analysis, we adopt the conservative assumption that the 
composition of the governing bodies remains constant until a change is reported in the database. 
15
 AFSSEF means “Access to financial services for Senegale women” (in French : “Accès des Femmes Sénégalaises aux 
Services Financiers”). 
  10 
business loans, personal loans, CFE
16
 commercial loans, and so-called “In Fine loans” subject to a 
bullet repayment.
17
 The credit officers are in charge of directing loan applicants toward the loan type 
that fits their needs. Table B1 in Appendix B provides the characteristics and market shares of each 
type of loans. Once the loan category is fixed, loan size is the sole credit condition tailored to the 
applicant’s profile. The loan-granting methodology adopted by UM-PAMECAS is in line with that 
of the bulk of the microfinance industry which typically supplies standardized short-to-medium-term 
loans with fixed interest rates and rigid repayment schedule (Armendariz and Morduch, 2010). 
Since its creation, UM-PAMECAS exhibit a strong concern for female participation (Tall Ba 
and Cissé, 2009). On average over the studied period, the share of women is 52% in total 
membership and 65% among borrowers. However, women receive significantly smaller loans, which 
explains that only 49% of the total disbursed amount is allocated to women. On average, the loan 
granted to a female borrower is nearly half the size of the loan granted to her male counterpart. 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics first globally, then disaggregated by the gender-related 
board composition. In particular, it shows that 58% of the LCs operate in urban areas whereas the 
remaining 42% are located in peri-urban and rural areas (Table A1 in Appendix A). The average LC 
is ten years old, holds a total asset of EUR 1.5M and serves 10,035 members, out of which 52% are 
female. The mean percentage of women in the LC board reaches 36%, whereas only 32% of 
managers are female. LCs provide on average 139 loans per month out of which 65% go to women. 
However, loans to women represent only 49% of total credit. The gender-blind average loan size is 
EUR 692,
18
 while the gender-sensitive averages are EUR 520 and 1,021 for women and men, 
respectively.  
Table 1 reveals that most characteristics are significantly different in female- and male-
dominated boards. Namely, FCs with more than 50% women on board are significantly larger than 
the others in terms of both total asset and number of members. Logically, female-dominated boards 
                                                        
16
 CFE means “Financial centre for entrepreneurs” (in French: “Centre Financier aux Entrepreneurs”). These relatively 
large loans require a business plan. They are granted at the CU level. 
17
 In Fine loans are meant to finance agriculture, stockbreeding, and other activities that generate irregular cash flows. 
18 This represents 0.5% of the PPP Senegalese GNI per capita in 2010 (WBI, 2011). 
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are more likely in FCs with more female members. Interestingly, male-dominated boards still include 
an average percentage of 31% of women. The likelihood to have a female manager is much higher in 
male-dominated boards than in female-dominate ones (34% versus 22%). This striking fact will be 
further investigated in Table 2. 
Loan allocation also depends on the board composition. Table 1 shows that LCs with female-
dominated boards supply more loans, and the difference is disproportionate with respect to the 
difference in membership sizes. These LCs also serve more women, which results in a larger share of 
total credit going to female borrowers. The gender-blind average loan size is not affected by the 
board composition. Strikingly however, female-dominated boards tend to offer smaller loans to 
women and larger loans to men. Our regression analysis will provide more clues on this evidence. 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: Global and Disaggregated by Board Composition 
Variables 
Global  
mean 
Global 
S.D. 
Mean 
t-test Board > 50% 
women 
(N = 262) 
Board > 50% men 
 
(N =1056) 
General characteristics      
Total asset in kEUR  1,504 727 1,880 1,410 -9.66*** 
# Members 10,035 5,048 12,827 9,343 -10.40*** 
% Female members 52 7 56 51 -10.51*** 
Governance       
% Women in board 36 13 56 31 -42.70*** 
% Female managers 32 47 22 34 3.81*** 
Loans      
# Loans (per month)  139 100 204 123 -12.59*** 
% Loans to Women 65 10 69 64 -6.79*** 
% Total credit to women 49 14 51 49 -1.88** 
Average loan size (ALS) in 
EUR 
692 277 675 696 1.12 
ALS in EUR: Female 
borrowers 
520 278 484 528 2.19** 
ALS in EUR: Male 
borrowers 
1,021 495 1,116 997 -3.48*** 
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p < 0.10      
The descriptive statistics disaggregated by the manager’s gender (Table 2) delivers a picture 
that seems to contradict the literature consensus according to which female managers are more 
socially oriented than their male counterparts. When compared to male managers, female ones are 
indeed associated with fewer loans to women and higher loan sizes for both men and women. The 
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combination of fewer loans to women with these loans being larger results in the insensitivity of the 
share of total credit to women to the manager’s gender. Importantly, Table 2 confirms that female 
managers are more frequent in FCs with more male members and more male board members. 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics Disaggregated by Manager’s Gender 
Variables 
Mean 
t-Test Fem manager 
 (N = 423) 
Male manager 
(N = 1108) 
Gender     
% Female members 50 54 7.68*** 
% Women in board 32 38 7.99*** 
Loans    
# Loans (per month)  138 129 -1.69** 
% Loans to Women 64 66 3.73*** 
% Total credit allocated to women 50 50 0.46 
Average loan size (ALS) in EUR 767 653 -6.43*** 
ALS in EUR: Female borrowers 591 490 -5.79*** 
ALS in EUR: Male borrowers 1,064    988 -2.646*** 
             *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p < 0.10              
The figures from both Tables 1 and 2 point out that the relationship between the manager’s 
gender and the percentage of female board members is not random. Table 3 investigates this 
relationship further by means of a contingency table. A Pearson test confirms that female managers 
are significantly more frequently associated with male-dominated boards, and vice versa (p < 0.01).  
Table 3. Manager’s Gender and Board Composition: Contingency Table 
 
Board > 50% 
men 
Board > 50% 
women 
Total 
 
Male 
Manager 
694 204 
898 
(719.6)  (178.4) 
Female 
Manager 
363 58 
421 
(337.4) (83.6) 
Total 1,057 262 1,319 
Expected frequencies given in parentheses 
Pearson independence test: 2(1) = 14.39 (p < 0.01) 
 
This result suggests that the CU makes strategic staff allocation and preferably sends male 
managers to FCs with female-dominated boards. While the CU hardly influences the board 
composition, it fully controls the allocation of the managers. In addition, the CU knows the board 
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composition when choosing the manager its sends to an LC.
19
 Hence, we interpret Table 3 as 
evidence of the aim of the CU management to curb social biases induced by female board members. 
Such biases might indeed hinder the consolidated financial situation of the network. Being in charge 
of the financial sustainability at the network level, the CU is logically concerned with restraining 
local FCs from adopting costly social orientations. As a consequence, the one-dimensional statistics 
provided in Table 2 could be misleading. Further econometric analysis is needed to disentangle the 
social impact of female managers from those driven by board members. The next section is devoted 
to that task. 
 
4. Gender and Social Performances 
 
To investigate the impacts on the social performances of both the manager’s gender and board 
composition, we use fixed-effect (FE) panel estimation. Controlling for the stable LC characteristics, 
whether observable and not, reduces the risk of omitted-variable biases. Our data covers four years 
only. Therefore, we use a FE model based on mean-differenced data – also referred to as within-
estimation model (Hausman and Taylor, 1981) – in order to avoid losing one period of observations 
as would for instance be the case had we opted for an FE model in differences. Moreover, the within-
method removes panel-level averages from each side of the model, which makes the LC-specific 
effect disappear. 
A test performed in Section 3 has shown that the gender of the manager is not independent 
from the board composition. Female managers are more frequent in FCs with male-dominated 
boards. Hence, to capture the impact of the manager’s gender on social performances, we need to 
take into account its interactions with the gender composition of the board as well. To this purpose 
we use three dummy variables, the reference modality being the combination of a male-dominated 
board with a male manager. The model writes: 
                                                        
19 Still, the board composition can change while a manager is in place. 
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    (         )                           (1) 
where     represents the social performance of interest observed for LC i at time t,       represents 
the year-specific dummies,
20hi  is the LC-specific effect that captures unobserved time-invariant 
characteristics, and eiti is the idiosyncratic disturbance term. The control variables include the 
percentage of female members, and the size of LC proxied by total asset.
21
 Model (1) allows us to 
analyze the variation of regressors over time within each LC as well as their variation over LC within 
each period. Consequently, we control for both time-invariant LC-specific variables and time-
varying LC-insensitive variables.  
In model (1), the explained variable is a measure of LC social performance. We capture social 
performances along two different dimensions. First, we consider the share of credit allocated to 
women, measured either in number of loans or in total credit. Second, we concentrate on average 
loan size, which is the typical proxy for the depth of outreach. Although these two types of 
performances are equally meaningful, they can be interpreted differently. Measures related to the 
borrowers’ gender could capture some kind of “gender affinity” rather than “pure” social orientation. 
In contrast, gender-blind average loan size is directly linked to poverty alleviation. Nevertheless, the 
both types of performances are intertwined since women are poorer than men on average. To 
disentangle them, we will also pay attention to gendered average loan sizes.  
The regression results for the five social performances are featured in Table 4. The focus of our 
analysis is on the impact of female managers. In this regard, regression (1) shows that the share of 
loans granted to women is not significantly affected by the gender of the manager. Neither is this 
share influenced by the board gender domination. These results rule out the “gender affinity” 
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 The reference year (omitted dummy) is 2007. 
21
 In the literature, two variables are typically used to proxy FC size: the total asset and the number of members. To avoid 
multicollinearity, only one of these variables may be included in regressions. Here, we have favored total asset for which 
we dispose of accurate monthly observations. In contrast, in our database the number of members is updated only a few 
times a year.  
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hypothesis.
22
 Likewise, regression (2) shows that the share of credit allocated to female borrowers is 
hardly affected by gender-specific variables. The only detectable impact (significant at the 10% 
level) is obtained in the situation where a female borrower is associated with a female-dominated 
board. Together, the results from regressions (1) and (2) reveal that the differences found in Tables 1 
and 2 are mainly attributable to external shocks captured through year dummies. The loadings of 
these dummies (not reported here) indicate that the proportion of loans granted to women decreased 
over the years.  
Table 4. Impact of Gender on Social Performances: Fixed-Effect Panel Estimation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES % Loans to 
Women 
% Total Credit  
to Women 
Average 
loan size 
(ALS) 
ALS: Female 
Borrowers 
ALS: Male 
Borrowers 
      
Board > 50% women 0.00714 0.0350* -51.50** -8.112 -110.9 
                *Fem manager (0.0117) (0.0184) (23.96) (23.92) (68.35) 
 
Board > 50% men                 -0.0335 -0.0262 100.9*** 77.76*** 121.1*** 
               *Fem manager 
 
(0.0248) (0.0198) (20.35) (12.64) (15.21) 
 
Board > 50% women 0.0129 0.00435 -11.90 -10.12 17.93 
               *Male Manager (0.00824) (0.0103) (26.20) (15.98) (48.67) 
 
 
% Fem members 
 
0.0322 
 
-0.0892 
 
10.69 
 
-214.6 
 
627.5 
 (0.0830) (0.0896) (156.3) (135.5) (499.9) 
 
Total asset (in kEUR) -1.69e-05 1.10e-05 0.0863* 0.0784 0.0619 
 (1.23e-05) (1.45e-05) (0.0437) (0.0476) (0.0578) 
 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Constant 
 
0.688*** 
 
0.534*** 
 
529.7*** 
 
511.4*** 
 
539.5* 
 (0.0498) (0.0560) (114.4) (91.20) (282.9) 
      
Observations 1,311 1,311 1,311 1,309 1,309 
# id 36 36 36 36 36 
R2_Within 0.113 0.0474 0.0213 0.0132 0.00716 
R2 _Between 0.0338 0.0111 0.200 0.193 0.0160 
R2_Overall 0.0623 0.0209 0.0749 0.0726 0.0134 
F 26.34*** 9.012*** 27.10*** 9.221*** 28.29*** 
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p < 0.10               
 
In contrast, regression (3) in Table 4 shows that female managers have a strong and significant 
impact on average loan size. However, this impact is negative when the female manager is associated 
with a female-dominated board and positive when she is associated with a male-dominated board. 
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Again, regressions (4) and (5) exclude any gender-specific impact on loan size. The loadings of 
gender-sensitive variables in the male and female average loan size equations exhibit same signs and 
significance levels for all governance configurations. The loadings are slightly larger (in absolute 
value) for men simply because men benefit from larger loans in general. 
Table 5. Impact of Gender on Social Performances: Using a 33% Threshold 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES % Loans to 
Women 
% Total 
Credit to 
Women 
ALS ALS: Female 
Borr 
ALS: Male 
Borr 
      
Board > 33% women -0.0202 -0.0115 11.81 15.04 -5.106 
                *Fem manager (0.0208) (0.0238) (35.18) (30.50) (56.19) 
Board < 33% women -0.0147 0.000542 66.66** 56.11*** 71.60* 
                *Fem manager (0.0228) (0.0214) (28.07) (18.58) (38.26) 
Board > 33% women 0.0105 -0.00137 -6.900 -22.65 25.81 
                *Male manager (0.0112) (0.0166) (33.13) (39.13) (54.27) 
% Fem Members 0.0335 -0.0800 0.729 -213.3 596.6 
 (0.0838) (0.0901) (158.8) (135.7) (499.5) 
 
Total Asset (in kEUR) -1.32e-05 1.97e-05 0.0812* 0.0753* 0.0461 
 (1.35e-05) (1.47e-05) (0.0439) (0.0439) (0.0523) 
 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Constant 0.677*** 0.513*** 556.9*** 532.3*** 591.8** 
 (0.0501) (0.0550) (113.1) (86.61) (272.6) 
      
Observations 1,311 1,311 1,311 1,309 1,309 
R-squared 0.111 0.046 0.020 0.013 0.006 
# id 36 36 36 36 36 
R2_Within 0.111 0.0457 0.0196 0.0132 0.00590 
R2 _Between 0.0732 0.0539 0.149 0.184 0.00127 
R2_Overall 0.0779 0.0409 0.0518 0.0641 0.00260 
F 16.81*** 7.55*** 4.70*** 4.60*** 2.01* 
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p < 0.10               
 
Next, to check whether the majority threshold of 50% is necessary to female board-members to 
bring their social agenda to the front, we use the 33%-threshold instead of the 50%-threshold used in 
Table 4. Table 5 shows that LCs with both a female manager and a board with less that 33% of 
female members provide larger loans. However, 33% of female board members seem insufficient to 
drive a significant impact.  
Last, we capture the board composition by means of the percentage of women sitting in the 
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board instead of threshold-based variables. Although the signs of the loadings in Table 6 are 
consistent with those from Table 4, the regressions deliver insignificant estimates. The results 
suggest that the influence of female board-members is conditioned on having reached the majority 
control threshold in the board. This is line with the fact that corporate control is a discontinuous 
variable rather than a continuous one (Chapelle and Szafarz, 2005).  
Table 6. Impact of Gender on Social Performances: Using the Share of Women in the Board  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES % Loans to 
Women 
% Total credit  
to Women 
Average loan 
size 
(ALS) 
ALS: 
Female 
borrowers 
ALS:  
Male  
borrowers 
      
% Women in LC board 0.0413 -0.00264 -44.77 -48.28 -109.9 
 (0.0503) (0.0491) (116.3) (88.43) (224.7) 
Fem manager -0.0194 -0.0277 80.88 59.78 176.3* 
 (0.0373) (0.0340) (74.06) (58.32) (99.04) 
% Women in LC board -0.00844 0.0617 -86.68 -27.22 -374.4 
* Fem manager (0.0689) (0.0794) (183.5) (150.9) (258.5) 
% Fem members 0.0341 -0.0848 -0.835 -220.7 620.2 
 (0.0840) (0.0899) (161.5) (136.8) (501.6) 
 
Total asset (in kEUR) -1.53e-05 1.39e-05 0.0748 0.0717 0.0429 
 (1.32e-05) (1.50e-05) (0.0460) (0.0467) (0.0581) 
 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Constant 0.670*** 0.525*** 578.1*** 546.8*** 631.4** 
 (0.0585) (0.0617) (125.1) (99.14) (275.2) 
      
Observations 1,311 1,311 1,311 1,309 1,309 
R-squared 0.111 0.046 0.018 0.012 0.007 
# id 36 36 36 36 36 
R2_Within 0.111 0.0459 0.0185 0.0122 0.00667 
R2 _Between 0.0548 0.0251 0.151 0.186 0.00405 
R2_Overall 0.0668 0.0277 0.0499 0.0618 0.00129 
F 17.20*** 8.597*** 2.540** 2.271** 1.731 
 
Overall, our results stress that female managers pay close attention to harmonious 
collaboration with local board members. They tend to follow the preferences of the majority of board 
members they are working with and refrain from prioritizing the financial objective of the CU they 
are appointed by. An alternative explanation could be that female managers are intrinsically socially-
oriented but are powerless when associated with a male-dominated board. This scenario is however 
inconsistent with the facts. Indeed, female managers associated with male-dominated boards grant 
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significantly higher loan sizes than male managers associated with male-dominated boards (the 
reference modality). Female manager are thus efficient in their work but they align their objectives 
on those of their local boards. In contrast, the behavior of male managers is insensitive to the 
composition of local boards.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Despite a women-friendly orientation associated with democratic principles, the governing and 
executive bodies of financial cooperatives remain predominantly male-dominated, though with a 
significant minority of women involved. This paper brings new insights on the impact of gender in 
the management of hybrid organizations by exploiting a unique data released by a network of 
financial cooperatives in Senegal. The main finding of this paper is that female managers tend to 
align their objectives on those of the local boards even though their hierarchy is located at the central 
level. 
Our empirical strategy takes advantage of the double bottom-line of financial cooperatives to 
identify the line of action female top managers follow in their everyday practice. The fact that female 
managers behave in accordance with local authorities could explain why the central union is less 
keen to hire female top managers than male ones. Consistently with the facts, the central union is 
also tempted to send female managers to local cooperatives with male-dominated boards. Indeed, 
male-dominated boards are more rigid on financial discipline. Hence, sending female managers to 
places where men hold the majority of the board is a way to push these managers to serve the central 
union’s best interests.  
The literature provides several rationales for the behavioral evidence detected in this paper. 
Sturges (1999) observes that female managers are less inclined than men to define career success in 
terms of hierarchical progression. Moreover, female managers tend to adopt a participative style and 
use their relational skills (Buttner, 2001). When they depart from this gender-role model and opt for 
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a more confrontational leadership style, female managers are judged by their subordinates more 
severely than their male colleagues (Korabik et al., 1993; Eagly and Karau, 2002). All these 
arguments could explain why female managers refrain from hurting the feelings of the local board 
members despite the fact that these board members have barely any impact on their careers.  
Interestingly, our findings partly contradict the common wisdom according to which, under 
similar circumstances, women are systematically more socially oriented than men. While female-
dominated boards enhance social loan allocation policies, female managers associated with male-
dominated boards do not mitigate the financial discipline imposed by the board. In fact, they 
reinforce it. Admittedly, our database is limited to a single network of financial cooperatives 
operating in Senegal. This restricts the external validity of our conclusions. Moreover, cultural 
characteristics and social norms vary across countries. Further research could investigate how female 
top managers influence the social performances of hybrid institutions in both developed and 
developing countries.
23
  
This paper concentrates on tensions between social and financial performances from a gender 
perspective. Alternatively, we could have directly questioned the alignment of male and female 
managers with the objectives of their employer, the central union. However, beyond securing the 
financial sustainability of the whole network, the objectives of the central union is not clear-cut. 
Evidently, profit seeking is not the sole driver of this organization. Moreover, the governance of 
cooperatives is knowingly more complex than that of for-profit firms (Cornforth, 2004). For all these 
reasons, it is difficult, if not impossible, to assess the alignment of top managers’ behavior with their 
employer’s objectives. The best we could do is to compare the on-field interactions of male and 
female managers with their local board members. Admittedly, this leaves room for further 
investigation on the efficiency of top managers in cooperatives. 
Worldwide non-profit and hybrid organizations are typically less reluctant than for-profits to 
hire female top managers. The sector is also known for producing higher job satisfaction than for-
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 The book “Women in Management Worldwide” edited by Davidson and Burke (2011) proposes interesting 
international comparisons. However, the only African country present in the survey is South Africa. 
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profit firms (Benz, 2005). So far, these two features have been observed independently. Possibly, 
they are linked. The female managers’ tendency to behave consensually can indeed contribute to 
enhancing overall satisfaction not only among co-workers but also among members of governing 
bodies.  
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Appendix A: Characteristics of UM-PAMECAS LCs 
 
Table A1. General Characteristics (in May 2010) 
LC Region Location 
Date of 
creation 
Total 
asset (in 
kEUR) 
MECYD Rufisque Rural 1998 901 
MEC Bargny Rufisque Periurban 1996 1,503 
MECREST Rufisque Periurban 1996 989 
CEC/Plateau Rufisque Periurban 1996 1,408 
MECZOR Rufisque Periurban 1996 1,257 
MERCMBAO Pikine Periurban 1999 975 
MECTG Pikine Urban 1999 1,178 
MECDIAM Pikine Urban 1996 1,545 
MECZOMA Pikine Periurban 1996 2,011 
MECZONY Pikine Urban 1996 1,714 
MECIB Pikine Urban 1997 2,570 
MECGR Pikine Urban 1996 1,128 
MECNI Pikine Urban 1996 1,629 
MECMAC Pikine Urban 2000 1,280 
MECKAW Guédiawaye Urban 1996 1,255 
MECZON Guédiawaye Urban 1996 1,503 
MECZOG1 Guédiawaye Urban 1996 1,444 
MECREL Guédiawaye Urban 1997 942 
MECPAG Guédiawaye Urban 1996 2,135 
MEC OUAKAM Dakar Urban 1997 2,593 
MECNGOR Dakar Urban 1999 737 
MECSOM Dakar Urban 1998 963 
MECBT Dakar Urban 1998 2,500 
MEC/CDGY Dakar Urban 1999 2,281 
MECPA Dakar Urban 1999 1,661 
MECY Dakar Urban 2006 2,055 
MECMBOUR Thies Periurban 2003 3,410 
MECTHIES Thies Urban 2004 4,758 
MEC/TIVAOUANE Thies Periurban 2004 1,599 
MEC Touba Touba Urban 2007 1,630 
MEC Louga Louga Periurban 2006 1,454 
MEC Dahra Louga Rural 2006 860 
MEC Kebemer Louga Periurban 2006 945 
MECSL Saint-Louis Urban 2006 1,212 
MECRT R-T Saint-Louis Rural 2006 705 
MEC NDIOUM Saint-Louis Rural 2006 651 
MEC/OUROS Matam Periurban 2009 511 
MEC KAOLACK Kaolack Periurban 2009 376 
Mean Total 
   
1,533 
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Table A2: Governance and Social Characteristics (May 2010) 
 
 
 
LC 
Members  Governance  Loans  ALS 
Total 
% 
Women 
 
% Women 
in the 
board  
Fem 
manager 
 
% Loan 
to 
women 
% Credit 
to 
women 
 
All 
borrowers 
Female 
borrowers 
Male 
borrowers 
MECYD 4,626 0.47  0.32 1  0.49 0.24  508,924 254,872 756,625 
MEC Bargny 12,644 0.52  0.16 0  0.68 0.29  283,960 153,189 555,787 
MECREST 10,531 0.53  0.32 1  0.53 0.33  495,975 312,097 699,554 
CEC/Plateau 9,942 0.57  0.58 0  0.63 0.39  473,230 310,563 748,214 
MECZOR 10,037 0.48  0.21 1  0.67 0.55  387,832 335,197 495,946 
MERCMBAO 7,240 0.46  0.36 0  0.70 0.63  617,561 555,614 758,800 
MECTG 6,519 0.49  0.32 0  0.29 0.24  371,403 325,386 389,809 
MECDIAM 13,973 0.55  0.71 1  0.55 0.41  445,113 326,020 592,848 
MECZOMA 17,184 0.46  0.19 0  0.60 0.27  522,482 240,887 948,579 
MECZONY 15,907 0.51  0.53 0  0.68 0.45  431,343 284,448 744,866 
MECIB 20,212 0.58  0.37 0  0.64 0.63  601,422 594,669 613,667 
MECGR 9,875 0.51  0.36 0  0.45 0.23  541,011 278,125 755,612 
MECNI 14,589 0.49  0.17 0  0.75 0.67  366,361 327,046 483,243 
MECMAC 7,387 0.55  0.18 1  0.58 0.39  691,781 472,024 989,516 
MECKAW 10,737 0.46  0.36 0  0.58 0.31  563,137 299,153 925,349 
MECZON 11,758 0.53  0.26 1  0.58 0.27  441,570 218,000 752,083 
MECZOG1 11,673 0.49  0.21 1  0.64 0.39  530,310 321,181 897,561 
MECREL 7,121 0.53  0.37 0  0.72 0.66  471,739 433,000 573,684 
MECPAG 14,560 0.56  0.45 0  0.64 0.74  898,103 1,035,714 649,516 
MEC OUAKAM 13,785 0.47  0.00 1  0.63 0.65  636,553 659,375 597,429 
MECNGOR 4,147 0.38  0.37
(a)
 0  0.55 0.47  703,387 607,353 820,000 
MECSOM 8,345 0.47  0.29 1  0.66 0.51  514,318 396,552 742,000 
MECBT 19,228 0.51  0.17 1  0.57 0.61  651,667 701,471 586,538 
MEC/CDGY 18,336 0.50  0.33
(a) 
0  0.70 0.68  595,608 575,721 642,614 
MECPA 15,210 0.54  0.33 0  0.74 0.50  679,009 459,295 1,291,071 
MECY 5,819 0.38  0.00 0  0.49 0.36  734,367 579,872 885,000 
MECMBOUR 24,055 0.48  0.47 0  0.60 0.33  602,275 337,311 991,543 
MECTHIES 29,825 0.57  0.58 1  0.55 0.32  400,249 259,929 568,921 
MEC/TIVAOUANE 10,772 0.59  0.32 0  0.52 0.27  324,315 190,132 470,000 
MEC Touba 10,857 0.83  0.36 0  0.46 0.25  329,344 230,344 415,232 
MEC Louga 5,569 0.49  0.36 0  0.47 0.24  657,059 398,750 886,667 
MEC Dahra 4,141 0.62  0.45 0  0.68 0.57  362,338 302,034 489,647 
MEC Kebemer 4,000 0.51  0.27 0  0.47 0.41  378,148 354,365 398,958 
MECSL 5,634 0.66  0.55 0  0.55 0.27  468,262 315,000 652,656 
MECRT R-T 3,585 0.53  0.10 0  0.58 0.27  386,813 263,208 559,211 
MEC NDIOUM 3,371 0.55  0.45 0  0.60 0.49  341,346 279,032 433,333 
MEC/OUROS 1,621 0.44  . 0  0.41 0.26  345,187 221,104 432,046 
MEC KAOLACK 1,852 0.62  . 0  0.57 0.28  531,522 315,385 812,500 
Mean Total 10,702 0.52  0.33 0.29  0.58 0.42  507,501 382,195 684,385 
(a)
 Data from December 2009.  
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Appendix B: Additional Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table B1. Loan Typology 
Loan Purpose Share 
Average 
loan size 
(in EUR) 
Average 
duration 
(in days) 
Interest 
rate 
AFSSEF 
Specific loans with lower guarantee to facilitate female 
members access to loans 
48.1% 309 346 20%
a
 
Commercial Regular loans for commercial activities 33.2% 810 376 20%  
Personal Loans for personal purpose 11.6% 824 579 20%  
CFE Larger loans for small enterprises 1.2% 9,504 648 20%  
In Fine 
Loans with bullet repayment to finance stockbreeding 
and agriculture 
2.9% 522 202 14%
b 
      
a
 decreasing balance installments  
b
 flat balance installments 
 
 
Table B2. Correlation Matrix 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
% Loans to women 1 1 
     
 
  
Total asset 2 -0.03 1 
    
 
  
# Loans 3 0.08*** 0.64*** 1 
   
 
  
% Women in board 4 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.31*** 1 
  
 
  
Female manager 5 -0.09*** 0.18*** 0.04 -0.22*** 1 
 
 
  
% Female 
members  
6 0.41*** 0.01 0.33*** 0.36*** -0.19*** 1  
  
% Credit to women 7 0.62*** 0.01 -0.06** 0.003* 0.05* 0.05** 1 
  
ALS 8 -0.32*** 0.21*** -0.19** -0.07** 0.16*** -0.40*** -0.03 1  
ALS : Female 
borrowers 
9 -0.16*** 0.18*** -0.19*** -0.11*** 0.15*** -0.35*** 0.34*** 0.83*** 1 
ALS : Male 
borrowers 
10 -0.07*** 0.18*** -0.11*** 0.06** 0.07*** -0.21*** -0.25*** -0.74*** 0.32*** 
Pearson correlation coefficients: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p < 0.10               
 
 
 
 
Table B3. Time-Variations 
Year 
Total 
asset 
(in 
kEUR) 
% 
Women 
in board  
%  
Fem 
members 
%  
Fem 
Manager 
# Granted 
loans (per 
month) 
%  
Female 
borrowers 
% credit 
to 
women 
ALS 
ALS: 
Female 
borrowers 
ALS:  
Male 
borrowers 
2006 1,082 0.388 0.553 0.229 174 0.734 0.539 379,548 308,676 581,468 
2007 1,244 0.374 0.534 0.223 125 0.691 0.495 435,426 334,782 651,156 
2008 1,491 0.364 0.530 0.306 140 0.673 0.475 449,624 342,835 674,899 
2009 1,491 0.358 0.523 0.297 129 0.630 0.445 450,653 335,098 654,240 
2010 1,474 0.327 0.512 0.289 122 0.596 0.416 487,484 360,214 687,221 
Full 
period 
1,411 0.360 0.527 0.276 131 0.657 0.466 449,023 339,701 661,609 
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